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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

FLOID C. HARTMAN and
RUTH A.

HARTM.AN,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
Case No.

ORA ANll POTTER, P.USKY
OIL COHPANY and CHEVRON
OIL CONPANY,

16004

Defendants-Respondents.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On or about the 27th day of June, 1951, Defendant Potter's
predecessors William M. Potter and Rose K. Potter, sold to the
Plaintiffs certain real estate located in Duchesne County, Utah.
The land consisted of one hundred sixty (160) acres.

The Deed

contained a reservation of oil, gas, and mineral rights as follows:
"There is reserved unto the Grantors three-fourths (3/4)
of all the oil, gas, and mineral rights to the above land
belonging, 1-1ith the right of ingress and egress thereon
for the purpose of finding and producing oil, gas, and
minerals thereon.
This deed is given subject to a prior lease of all the oil,
gas, and mineral rights to said land belonging."
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Plaintiffs believed that they received, as part of the
conveyance, a one-fourth (1/4) interest of one hundred per cent
(100h) interest of the oil,
purchased by them.

~as,

and mineral rip.hts on the land

The original sellers are deceased and the

Defendant, Ora Ann Potter, is the daughter-in-law of the original
sellers.

The Defendants contend that the Plaintiffs received no

interest in the oil, gas, and mineral rights of the land purchased
by the Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs initiated

a~

action to quiet title to the oil,

gas, and mineral rights and further

r~quested

an accounting and

Judgment for such royalties to which Plaintiffs may have been
entitled.
DISPOSITIOll Hl LOVJER COURT
By stipulation the Defendants moved for Summary Judgment
requesting that the Court enter Judgment in Defendants' favor and
Plaintiffs moved for Summary Judrment in Plaintiffs' favor quieting
title to a maximum of twenty-five per cent (25%) of one hundred
per cent (100%) and a minimum of twelve and one-half per cent
(12-l/2%) of one hundred per cent (100%) of the oil, gas, and
mineral rights of the land in question in the Plaintiffs and orderinr,
an accounting and payment of royalties on the past production and
future production of oil, gas, and mineral on the land in question.
The Notions for Summary Judgment were heard on Friday,
June 2, 1978, at 10:00 o'clock a.m. by the Honorable David K. Winder,
District Judge.

On the 3rd day of July, 1978, Judgment was entered

in favor of the Defendants and against the Plaintiffs.
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RELIEF SOUGHT

on APPEAL

Plaintiffs seek a reversal of the Summary Judgment in
favor of the Defendants and seek Judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs
on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment.
STATEHEIJT OF FACTS
On or about June 27, 1951, the Plaintiffs purchased from
William M. Potter and Rose K. Potter, husband and wife, parents of
Defendant Potter's husband, certain property located in Duchesne
County, State of Utah, more particularly described as follows:
The Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter;
the Northwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter;
the Southeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter;
and the Northeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter,
of Section 32, Township 1 South, Range 4 Hest, U.S.M.,
containinp, 160 acres, more or less.
Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, the Sellers reserved unto
themselves a part of the oil, gas, and mineral rights to the land
purchased by the Plaintiffs using the following statement of
reservation:
"There is reserved unto the Grantors three-fourths (3/4)
of all the oil, gas, and mineral rights to the above land
belonging, with the right of ingress and egress thereon for
the purpose of finding and producing c:l, gas, and minerals
thereon.
This deed is given subject to a prior lease of all the oil,
gas, and mineral rights to said land belonging."
Prior to the sale of the land in question to the Plaintiffs,
the Sellers, William M. Potter and Rose K. Potter, his wife, conveyed
fifty per cent

(50~)

of all of the oil, gas, and mineral rights to

the aforesaid land to one C. R.

Bennett of Tulsa, Oklahoma, which

conveyance Has executed on July 29, 1946.
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-4The Plaintiffs contend that the wording in the Deed of
Conveyance between William M. Potter and Rose K. Potter, his wife,
to the Plaintiffs, which reserved a three-fourth (3/4) interest to

all of the oil, gas, and mineral rights on the one hundred sixty

(160) acres in question, was intended to reserve the fifty per cent
(50%) conveyed by the Potters to Mr. Bennett and an additional
twenty-five per cent

(25~)

to be reserved for the benefit of

William M. Potter and Rose K. Potter, his wife, or their heirs,
and twenty-five per cent (25%) interest to all of the oil, gas, and
mineral rights was intended to be conveyed to the Plaintiffs.

Under

this interpretation of the document, the entire one hundred per
cent (100/,) of the oil, gas, and mineral rights would be logically
accounted for.
The Defendants agree that fifty per cent (50%) of the oil,
gas, and mineral rights to the one hundred sixty (160) acres in
question was conveyed to C. R. Bennett in 1946.

The Defendants

contend, however, that William M. Potter and Rose K. Potter, his
wife, reserved an additional seventy-five per cent (75%) interest,
notwithstanding the fifty per cent (50%) previously conveyed to
C. R. Bennett and, therefore, the Plaintiffs received no mineral,
oil, or gas interest to the property purchased by the Plaintiffs
because the Potters reserved to themselves more than the total
interest available.
The Deed from William M. Potter and Rose K. Potter, his
wife, to the Plaintiffs can also be interpreted a third \vay.

That

is that William M. Potter and Rose K. Potter, his wife, intended
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-5to reserve to themselves seventy-five per cent (75%) of the remaining
oil and gas interest after the fifty per cent (50%) was conveyed,
thereby conveying to the Plaintiffs twenty-five per cent (25%) of
fifty per cent (50%), or twelve and one-half per cent (12-l/2%) of
one hundred per cent (100%) of the oil, gas, and mineral rights to
the property.
The lawsuit presently pending was brought to interpret, from
the provisions in the Deed and actions and conduct of the parties,
the intent of the parties as to the conveyance and reservation of
oil, gas, and mineral rights on the property.
The Deed in quesbion was prepared without the assistance
of lawyers and prepared by a clerk at one of the local banks in
Roosevelt, Utah.

(R 214, Plaintiff's Deposition Page ll, Lines 22

through 25.)

ARGUI1ENT
POINT l.
THE COURT ERRED IN GRAUTING DEFENDANTS'
SUMMARY JUDG!·1ENT M!D IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTIOll FOR SillJMARY JUDGNENT.
In reviewing the wording of the Deed, there is little
question that the reservation of oil, gas, and mineral rights is
ambiguous, especially considering the fact that prior to the
conveyance by the Defendant Potter's predecessors and the Plaintiffs,
fifty per cent (50%) of one hundred per cent (100%) interest of the
oil, gas, and mineral rights to the land in question had been conveyed
to C. R. Bennett of Tulsa, Oklahoma.

Since only fifty per cent (50%)
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-6of one hundred per cent (100%) of the oil, gas, and mineral ri~hts

to the land in question remained to Defendant Potter's predecessors,

the reference to a reservation of three-fourths (3/4) of all oil,
gas, and mineral rights to said land belonginr, can only be construed
to mean that the Grantor intended to protect the fifty per cent
(50%) previously conveyed plus an additional twenty-five per cent
(25%) for themselves or their heirs thereby conveying a remaininp,
twenty-five per cent (25%) to Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs conducted

themselves consistent with this belief as reflected in their
subsequent conveyances of the same parcel of land to others
(R, Page 6).

Plaintiffs also entered into lease agreements with

various companies believing that they owned a one-fourth (l/4)
interest to the oil. gas, and mineral rights on one hundred sixty
(160) acres of land in question (R. Page 5).

Had the lower

Court considered the conduct of the parties to the conveyance in
arriving at its conclusion as to the intent of the parties, there
would have been little question that the Plaintiffs fully believed
that they \.Jere the owners of a twenty-five per cent (25%) interest
to the oil, gas, and mineral rights on one hundred sixty (160)
acres of land purchased by

the~

from Defendant Potter's predecessors

In Clotworthy v. Clyde (1954) 265 P. 2d 420, 1 Utah 2d 251,
the Court stated:
"\-.There an instrument or instruments of title leave ambiguity
or uncertainty concerning intent, the Court may look to
surrounding circumstances to determine it."
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-7Also in Wood v. Ashby (1952) 253 P. 2d 351, 122 Utah 580, the
Court stated:
"vJhere prov~s~ons of a deed are doubtful in meaning, the
Court must also look to practical construction placed upon
the deed by the parties."
Also sec;:
Garcia v. Garcia (1974) 525 P. 2d 863, 86 HH 503.
\·Jhite v. Brooks 512 P. 2d 1350, 266 OR 506.
Furthermore, as a general rule, where ambiguity exists,
the Courts have consistently held that such ambiguous language in
mineral deeds should be construed against the grantor, especially
where no attorneys or lm.;yers were involved in the soliciting or
drafting of the agreement.

In Patterson v. Wilcox, 11 Utah 2d 264,

358 P. 2d 88, the Court stated:
"He agree that generally speaking, language in instruments
of grant is construable more strongly against the grantor."
In an earlier case, the Utah Supreme Court, in Wood v.
Ashby (1952) 253 P. 2d 351, 122 Utah 580, the Court held:
"It is generally conceded that a deed is to be construed
most strongly against grantor and most favorably to the
grantee."
In Hodgin v. State (1973) 513 P. 2d 304, 9 Hash App. 486,
the Washington Court stated:
"If a deed admits of more than one construction, it must
be construed ~ost strictly against grantor and most favorable
to grantee."
In this case, three separate interpretations of the document
are possible.
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The first is that the original grantors did not recall

their prior conveyance to C. R. Bennett of fifty per cent (50%) of

all the oil, gas, and mineral rights to the land in question and,
therefore, intended to retain seventy-five per cent (75%) of all
the oil, gas, and mineral rights to the one hundred sixty (160)
acres in question to themselves and their heirs.
(2)

The second interpretation would be that the grantors

understood and were aware of the fifty per cent (50%) previously
conveyed and intended to retain seventy-five per cent (75%) of
fifty per cent

(50~)

of the oil, gas, and mineral rights to the

one hundred sixty (160) acres in question thereby conveying to
the Plaintiffs twenty-five per cent (25%) of fifty per cent (50%)
or twelve and one-half per cent (12-1/2%) of one hundred per cent

(100%) of the oil, gas, and mineral rights to the one hundred
sixty (160) acres in question.
(3)

The third interpretation, which is the most logical

of the three possibilities, is that the original grantors, being
fully a1vare of the fifty per cent (SOlo) previously conveyed intended
to protect the fifty per cent (50%) previously conveyed and in
addition intended to retain an additional twenty-five per cent

(257) of one hundred per cent (100%) of the oil, gas, and mineral
rights to one hundred sixty (160) acres to the Plaintiffs.

Thus,

the original grantors reserved seventy-five per cent (75%) or
three-fourths (3/4) of one hundred per cent (1007) of the oil, gas,
and mineral rights of the land conveyed to the Plaintiffs.
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-9The lower Court elected to enter Judgment on the first of
the three possibilities holding that since the orieinal grantors
reserved a greater percentape of oil, gas, and mineral rights than
remained after
to C. R

t~e

original fifty per cent (SO%) had heen conveyed

Bennett, the original grantors had nothing left to convey

to Plaintiffs and, therefore, Plaintiffs received no oil, gas, and
mineral rights by the conveyance of one hundred sixty (160) acres
of land.
These circumstances are practically synonymous to contracts
ivhich have more than one possible meaning, one of which would
make the contract valid and the other which would rn.ake the contract
invalid.

It is clear that the Courts in most of the states have

accepted the rule that where a contract can be construed to produce a valid conveyance while another one did not,

the interpret-

ation preserving the legal effect of the document would be preferred.
In Corbin on Contracts, Vol.

3, Chapter 24, Section 546, p. 169,

the author states:
''If therefore, the words of a contract have more than one
possible meaning and one of these includes or would produce
a legal effect that court believes the parties intended to
produce, uhile another one Hould not, the court should
unhesitatingly adopt the first meaning."
In the circumstances before this Court, the trial court
adopted an interpretation of a document which presumes that the
original grantors from which Plaintiffs purchased the property
attempted to retain for themselves a greater interest in the oil,
gas, and mineral rights to the one hundred sixty (160) acres than
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-10was possible at the time of conveyance, considerinr, the original
fifty per cent (50%) which had previously been conveyed to C. R.
Bennett.

To do so is to assume that the original grantors were

unaware of the prior conveyance to C. R. Bennett or had forgotten
that the grant had been made.

The interpretation most consistent

with the facts surrounding the conveyance of one hundred sixty (160)
acres is to assume that the original grantors were fully cognizant
of the fifty per cent (50%) previously conveyed to C. R. Bennett,
intended to reserve to themselves an additional twenty-five per
cent (25%) of the oil, gas, and mineral rights and intended that
Plaintiffs receive the remaining twenty-five per cent (25%) of the
oil, gas, and mineral rights.
CONCLUSION
The Plaintiffs submit that the trial court erred in granting
a judgment against the Plaintiffs and in favor of the Defendants for
the following reasons:
1.

The conduct of the Plaintiffs reflect that they

believed

they had a twenty-five per cent (25%) interest to the oil, gas, and
mineral rights on the land purchased by them from Defendant Potter's
predecessors and such belief is reflected in the documents of sale
by the Plaintiffs to others and by the oil and gas lease entered
into between Plaintiffs and various oil companies.
2.

The case law as to ambiguous deeds clearly favors the

Plaintiffs' position in that ambiguous deeds are construed strongly
against the grantor and in favor of the grantee.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-11-

3.

Hhere more than one interpretation of the deed

is possible, the deed should be construed in a manner which would
make it valid and effective; and an interpretation should not be
adopted which would make the terms of the deed more ambiguous or
more conflicting.
Respectfully submitted,

KEFNETH M. HISATAKE
1825 South Seventh East
Salt Lake City, UT 84105
Attorney for Appellants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the foregoing Appellants' Brief was
served on counsel for the Respondents, Robert G. Pruitt, Jr., Pruitt

& Gushee, 875 Beneficial Life Tower, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, and
Clark R. Nielsen, Nielsen, Henriod, Gott fred son & Peck, 1+10 t7e\vhouse
Buildin~,

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, by mailing a copy thereof,

postage prepaid, on the

/

~~

day of October, 1978.

)

,_

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

----·

